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역할교환을 통한 확인Verification through Role Exchange

Other Titles
Verification through Role Exchange
Authors
안석환
Issue Date
Jun-2011
Publisher
한국산업조직학회
Keywords
role exchange; collective activity; verification; verifiability; observability; budget breaking; Nash equilibrium; 역할교환; 집단적 행위; 확인; 확인가능성; 관찰가능성; 예산불균형; 내쉬균형
Citation
산업조직연구, v.19, no.2, pp 91 - 103
Pages
13
Journal Title
산업조직연구
Volume
19
Number
2
Start Page
91
End Page
103
URI
https://scholarworks.sookmyung.ac.kr/handle/2020.sw.sookmyung/6998
ISSN
1226-2633
Abstract
The present study analyzes economic circumstances in which two agents whose individual valuations are unverifiable common knowledge decide on the implementation of a collective activity. This paper comes up with a very simple two-person game with balanced budget in which a truth-telling Nash equilibrium is the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
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