금융위기와 공정거래법

Abstract

The history of economic crises and antitrust laws tells us that antitrust laws or their implementation lies far from the cause or the underlying conditions of the crises. Nevertheless, since the adoption of the Sherman Act in 1890, antitrust laws have stepped back to the rear seat from the political pressures in difficult times, such as the Great Depression or the World Wars. But researches show us that the setback of antitrust laws during the Great Depression brought about the increase in price and the reduction of output, and delayed economic recovery. Thus competition authorities of the U.S. and the E.U. proclaimed their intention to stick to the principles of antitrust laws even in the financial crisis. However, it is generally accepted that more flexibility in procedure could help remedy the financially distressed firms in a swift manner. Considering above findings, this article suggests some recommendations on the proper way of antitrust law implementation in financial crisis. First, merger review in crisis could be under so much political pressure that agencies could not properly take into consideration competition concerns. But, as the failure in blocking anticompetitive mergers could result in long lasting welfare losses, they should do their best to cope with such pressure. Second, cartels could maintain jobs only by sacrificing future jobs, as they rend to reduce output and incentives for innovation. Thus cartels should be strictly prohibited even in the hard times. Third, procedural flexibility is feasible and desirable in meeting the urgent need to remedy financially distressed firms. Thus the competition authorities should quicken the review process and mitigate the procedural burdens of parties, as long as it is compatible with antitrust law principles.