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Effort Application in an Arranged Marriage: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Authors
AMITRAJEET A. BATABYAL유승직
Issue Date
Jan-2017
Publisher
Scientific Research Publishing
Citation
Theoretical Economics Letters, v.7, no. 1, pp 23 - 29
Pages
7
Journal Title
Theoretical Economics Letters
Volume
7
Number
1
Start Page
23
End Page
29
URI
https://scholarworks.sookmyung.ac.kr/handle/2020.sw.sookmyung/8701
DOI
10.4236/tel.2017.71003
ISSN
2162-2078
2162-2086
Abstract
In this note we study a simple game model of effort application by two individuals (1 and 2) who wish to have an arranged marriage. We first specify the net utility function of individual i as a function of this individual’s own effort and the effort applied by individual j,i ≠ j , in three distinct cases. Next, we compute the ith individual’s best response function. Finally, we analyze effort application by two identical pairs of individuals who are located in two different nations. In the first (second) nation, arranged marriages are uncommon (common) and hence it is relatively difficult (straightforward) for the two individuals to apply and coordinate effort. We explain why the net utility of the pair wishing to have an arranged marriage in the first nation is likely to be much lower than the corresponding net utility of the pair in the second nation.
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TESOL·국제학대학원 > 기후환경융합학과 > 1. Journal Articles

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