ScholarWorks@숙명여자대학교

초록

In this research, I examine the private equilibrium and social optimum in the choice of R&D investment modes (non-cooperative R&D vs. cross-licensing) for the duopoly structure with a potential entrant. The main results of this paper in Cournot competition case are as follows. First, for the high entry cost case, if the cost reduction due to the investment is large, then there occurs the ‘too little cross-licensing’ because the social optimum is cross-licensing whereas the private equilibrium is non-cooperative R&D. Second, for the medium or low entry cost case, there does not occur market failure since ‘cross-licensing’ become the private equilibrium as well as the social optimum. Next, the results in Stackelberg competition case are as follows. First, for the case of high entry cost, if the cost reduction by investment is small, then there occurs ‘excessive cross-licensing’ because the social optimum is non-cooperative R&D while the private equilibrium is cross-licensing. Second, for the medium entry cost case, there always occurs ‘excessive cross-licensing’ since the cross-licensing is the private equilibrium whereas the non-cooperative R&D becomes the social optimum. Third, for the low entry cost case, if the cost reduction by the investment is large, then there occurs ‘too little cross-licensing’ because the social optimum is cross-licensing while the private equilibrium is non-cooperative R&D.

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