ScholarWorks@숙명여자대학교

초록

German idealism begins with the legacy of Kant. In particular, when the German idealists made it a fundamental task to establish philosophy as 'science', the problem before them was to construct philosophy as a 'system' that Kant tried through 'criticism' but ultimately remained incomplete. In Critique of Judgment, Kant tries to overcome the disconnection between the jurisdiction of the concept of nature and the jurisdiction of the concept of freedom, and to complete the construction of metaphysics as a system. However, Hegel is skeptical of Kant's work. This is because he judges that although intellect and reason, which are the principles of rational knowledge, may be mediated in his work, the gap between the worlds constituted by these principles remains unresolved. So, why does Hegel make such a judgment? And why does he claim that the true mediation between the two worlds results in a speculative philosophy? This article examines Hegel's answer to these very questions. For this examination, it is necessary to first consider Kant's plans to unify the jurisdiction of the concept of the nature and the jurisdiction of the concept of the freedom through the concept of the purpose in Critique of Judgment, and secondly to look into Hegel's criticism against it. The focus here is obviously on the completion of metaphysics as a 'system' because the ultimate purpose of Hegel's speculative philosophy lies in completing the metaphysics as a 'system' that remains unfinished for Kant.

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