ScholarWorks@숙명여자대학교

초록

In recent years, cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in the realm of international peacekeeping has gone through major changes. Among various regional security organizations, the European Union (EU) has particularly reiterated its commitment to play a decisive role as a reliable peacekeeping actor within the UN framework. The UN welcomed the EU’s willingness to share itsheavy peacekeeping burden, and finally called upon the EU to play an importantrole in a wide range of international peacekeeping operations in close cooperation with the UN. However, empirical evidence suggests that UN-EU cooperationseems to not always happen as favorably as predicted in accordance with formalcommitments and agreements. Given this puzzling paradox, this paper seeks toanswer the primary research question: Who and/or what determines whether UN-EUpeacekeeping occurs? In order to examine the important conditions that may drivethe EU to decide to take a responsibility in a peacekeeping operation alongside theUN, the study provides analytical tools. Drawing upon Putnam’s two-level gamemetaphor, a new revised two-level game model in which a complex web of actorsinteracts simultaneously at two different levels is discussed: International UNlevel (Level I) and domestic EU level (Level II). The analysis shows how United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions are internationally achieved and howthe EU member states domestically come to agree on a Council Joint Action. Byinvestigating simultaneous negotiations and decision-making between the two levels, this paper identifies the most influential EU actors in terms of chief negotiators.

키워드