ScholarWorks@숙명여자대학교

초록

Clarifying what remains unclear in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus concerning “logical analysis” and “ostensive definition” is crucial for understanding the philosophy of the middle Wittgenstein. Furthermore, by examining the conception of ostensive definition in the Tractatus in relation to that of Wittgenstein’s middle period, we can gain insight into why the fundamental notion of the “languagegame” became inevitable in his later philosophy. I aim to show the following: In Tractatus 3.263 “elucidation” is a proposition, not an ostensive definition. The passage that deals with ostensive definition in a way corresponding to a rule is not 3.263 but 3.262. In 3.262, the Tractatus discusses the internal relation between an object and its name through the concepts of the “application of a sign” and “showing.” Within this line of inquiry, we are thereby able to clarify what is meant by the ‘application of logic’. In the Tractatus, the internal relation between symbol and reality at issue in an ostensive definition is initially unintelligible. In order to resolve this difficulty, Wittgenstein eventually comes to treat both the object pointed to and the gesture of pointing itself as belonging to language.

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