은행의 대리문제와 부실기업에의 출자전환

초록

n this paper, we examine whether the poor performance of distressed firms where banks take equity may occur due to agency problems in banks. By adopting the debt-equity swap, the bank can effectively postpone the occurrence of bad loans form the failure of the distressed firm. As a result, firms with more debt will be more likely to obtain debt-equity swap, regardless of their probabilities of revival. This is not because they are more profitable, but because they have more debt and thus it poses greater risk to the bank. We empirically look into these predictions with the data of 44 workout firms and find the following results. First, debt-equity swap appears to be more applicable especially when the distressed firms are large and when BIS of related banks is low. Specifically, the conditional probability of ‘large firms’ based on debt-equity swap is 65.52% and the conditional probability of ‘bad banks’ based on debt-equity swap is 75.86%. Also, as predicted, the performance of these debt-equity firms is poorer than that of non debt-equity firms. The conditional probability of ‘large firms’ based on posterior failure is 84.62% and the conditional probability of ‘bad banks’ based on posterior failure is 84.62%. This is consistent with our predictions and is also confirmed through results of the logit regression analysis. Second, when the restructuring is led by ‘good banks’, the performance of equity-swap firms is superior to that of non equity-swap firms. This result is consistent with that of James (1995). Hence, we can conclude that there may be some agency problems in restructuring distressed firm-especially when distressed firms are large and banks are bad. And these agency problems can reconcile the difference between James’ results and Park, Lee, and Jang’s.

키워드