ScholarWorks@숙명여자대학교

초록

In response to the recent surge in consumer and raw material prices, policy authorities globally are struggling with companies' strategies that aim to mitigate the resistance to price hikes. Instead of raising prices directly, such businesses are reducing the capacity or quality of their products - a phenomenon known as Shrinkflation. Given its widespread occurrence, combating Shrinkflation has become a crucial concern for international regulatory bodies, including the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), competition and consumer authorities, and legislators across the world. This paper explores the dynamics of Shrinkflation in line with global market trends, with a special focus on its legislative and regulatory aspects. This examination involves a close look at foreign regulatory cases concerning Shrinkflation, which is a de-facto price increase through capacity change. It also explores proper ways for applying Korea's Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trading Act (MRFTA) and Consumer Protection laws, concentrating particularly on the Fair Labeling and Advertising Act (FLAA). To accurately determine the laws and regulations applicable to Shrinkflation, we proposed a distinctive classification that distinguishes it into four types depending on specific characteristics it manifests in various business sectors. Furthermore, we studied the challenges that foreign competition authorities faced and explored the economic effects of Shrinkflation. We also analyzed how different countries deal with Shrinkflation, focusing specifically on instances where it was clearly regulated under Consumer Law. This part involved a comprehensive review of legislative trends in countries such as the United States, Germany, France, Brazil, and Hungary, and their implications on Korea. In light of the application of Korean law, the KFTC could contemplate applying the MRFTA to monopoly-induced Shrinkflation and the FLAA to Shrinkflation arising from information asymmetry. Our research findings suggest that the FLAA could regulate numerous types of Shrinkflation without significant regulatory loopholes. Past cases in Italy and Korea, where the competition authorities regulated Shrinkflation under the FLAA, provide evidence to support this conclusion. Given that the existing FLAA has shown a satisfactory capacity in regulating Shrinkflation, the necessity for separate legislation should be considered carefully. Instead, the paper recommends the inclusion of specific examples of Shrinkflation in the Notification on Designation of Types and Criteria of Unfair Labeling/Advertising or the Deceptive Labeling/Advertising Review Guidelines. This step would enhance these guidelines' predictability and provide clearer directives for those subject to FLAA.

키워드