Convergence and divergence of US and South Korean strategies toward North Korea's nuclear program

초록

Over the last decade and a half, both U.S.-North Korea and inter-Korean relations exhibited a pendulum swing between periods of confrontation and accommodation. Between the U.S. and South Korea, there emerged both divergence and convergence in the strategies toward North Korea. This paper seeks to explain the convergence and divergence of South Korean and U.S. strategies toward North Korea's nuclear program on the basis of a theoretical framework that is derived from Robert Jervis's (1976) discussion of the spiral model and deterrence theory, and Glenn Snyder's (1984,1997) alliance security dilemma between abandonment and entrapment. The major argument of this paper is that the convergence and divergence of U.S. and South Korean strategies toward North Korea can be explained by each alliance member's belief about North Korea's intentions, the nature of its demand, and the relative costs of concessions and military conflict. Each alliance member's strategy toward North Korea is also constrained by the presence of an alliance security dilemma in the form of two dangers-entrapment and abandonment.

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