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초록
The present study analyzes economic circumstances in which two agents whose individual valuations are unverifiable common knowledge decide on the implementation of a collective activity. This paper comes up with a very simple two-person game with balanced budget in which a truth-telling Nash equilibrium is the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
키워드
role exchange; collective activity; verification; verifiability; observability; budget breaking; Nash equilibrium; 역할교환; 집단적 행위; 확인; 확인가능성; 관찰가능성; 예산불균형; 내쉬균형
- 제목
- 역할교환을 통한 확인
- 제목 (타언어)
- Verification through Role Exchange
- 저자
- 안석환
- 발행일
- 2011-06
- 저널명
- 산업조직연구
- 권
- 19
- 호
- 2
- 페이지
- 91 ~ 103