한미동맹의 위기와 동맹관리역량의 평가

Abstract

This article attempts to draw from the vast literature of alliance politics and discuss the implications for South Korea's alliance relations with the United States. By using the term "alliance management" to describe the process of maintaining the cohesion of an alliance after it has successfully addressed its initial threat and has gone through a situation in which the comfortable calculus or rationale that guided the cooperative venture in its formative stage is no longer present, this study discusses the possibility of whether those strategies mainly drawn from the U.S.-NATO partnership can be applied to the case of the ROK-US alliance for emulation. Those, who have studied alliance politics, suggest that effective alliance management starts from the assumption that the cohesion or continuity of an alliance depends on the delicate balancing act between conflicting and diverging forces. Effective alliance management is necessary because an alliance is a political calculation based on the recognition that despite the differing and conflicting interests of allied states, the assistance of the other is still needed in order to gain or maintain their commone security interests. Authors agree that in order to halt and survive the drift, allies must quickly manage disagreements and prevent inter-ally disputes from turning into chronic dissent that might put the coalition in jeopardy. At least, two approaches need to be addressed: First, alliance scholars suggest that an effective alliance management must involve the reformulation of the raison d'etre or threat perception of the alliance in order to contain unavoidable disagreement on the changing calculus of the new and emerging security environment. They argue that the identification of a new threat helps produce a new accord by helping a counterpart realize that the cost of a non-compromise will be greater than the cost demanded by cooperation. Second, scholars emphasize that in order to prevent the differing opinions and interests of allies from evolving into chronic and dysfunctional disputes, the allies have to effect some policies to facilitate the process of institutionalization or transform the alliance inertia into cybernetic-like programmatic responses, the content of which reflects those policy instruments that decision-makers find to be familiar and accessible. They maintained that it is important to transform the alliance inertia into a dynamic force that can be used to strengthen and expand the alliance and to provide a new rationale to a coalition. However, this study concludes that both the South Korean and United States governments are unable to implement such effective problem-solving mechanisms that prevent a general loosening of alliance ties and thus pre-empt the disintegration of an alliance. The major reason is that Seoul and Washington have been unable to reduce the huge perception gap in addressing the threat of North Korea, which in turn have led to different opinions on what are the appropriate means and roles in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. Moreover, American and Korean officials have not yet agreed upon how to address the problems of the increasing hyperactive Korean nationalism and the new democracy in Korea. According to recent polls, public criticism of the U.S. by Koreans has not dwindled. Moreover, President Roh and those politicians, who have continuously called for reforms, are not likely to turn a deaf ear to such a strong demand from the younger generation for a more equitable partnership, especially when the election is coming around the comer. Therefore, it is highly unlikely to that the South Korean government will come up with a compromising act to carry out proactive measures to create a new sense of belonging. Several authors who have studied the U.S.-NATO relationship suggest that constructing organs of communication that allow the parties to convey their genuine positions on issues is very important for alliance cohesion. Perhaps this is the most appropriate direction for both Washington and Seoul to pursue for the time being, at least for the sake of damage control. This study also briefly discusses Seoul's recent decision to send troops to Iraq. It could have been the golden opportunity to create a new kind of goal that would share the vision of alliance for the future. Yet, Seoul has failed to recognize the opportunity to demonstrate its value to the United States, the desperate partner that wanted Seoul's unique contribution, because the former was preoccupied by the domestic costs that such an endeavor would bring. Another point of concern is that the U.S. is still in a good position to make Seoul's defection costly for the Roh administration. The fact that the Japan-US alliance is capturing the primary position in America's 21st century security policy in East Asia will definitely reduce the value of the Seoul-Washington security relationship. Unfortunately, the South Korean government's ability to generate support for alliance continuity is extremely limited due to the pressure from domestic constituent groups that include reform-oriented National Assembly members, interest groups, the media, and some key officials of bureaucratic agencies. This study concludes with the observation that allies may be constrained from making an alliance that would have been preferable to the alternative. Seoul has every right in learning from its own mistakes and confusion, but it is our common duty to do our utmost in investing for the next generation and nurturing them to overcome the difficulties and endure the crisis by maximizing the joint benefits of both countries.