북한과 한ㆍ미관계: 평가와 대응책

Abstract

Since the October 1994 Geneva agreements, the United States has adopted a soft landing policy as its policy principle in dealing with North Korea by emphasizing the value of inducing Pyongyang toward economic reforms and opening doors to the outside world. From the U.S. perspective, the reason why Washington has taken increasing notice recently of its North Korean policy is the growing possibility of a North Korean regime collapse in the wake of the North's food shortages and other serious economic problems. This perception is based on the U.S. concern that a rapid North Korean collapse will undermine regional stability in Northeast Asia as well as place a heavy burden on the South Korean economy. In this context, the more that instability increases on the Korean peninsula, the more the United States will be engaged in the region -- a major divergence from the initial U.S. intention to encourage North Korea to open up while the Unites States maintained its deterrence against its potential North Korean threat toward the South. Currently, there is no consensus among scholars and other authorities regarding the likelihood of an immediate North Korean collapse. In the absence of clear evidence of a collapse, it is difficult to conclude that such a scenario is likely. In this paper, I will cover recent discussions in academic communities domestically and abroad regarding the scenario of a North Korean collapse. I will also examine whether changes may be necessary in Seoul's policy toward North Korea and in U.S. initiatives on behalf of its North Korean soft landing policy: further, whether or not North Korea can overcome its economic crisis and the current regime will survive. In addition, I will also analyze what steps Seoul should take to develop a new strategy for a better relationship with the United States at a time when South Korea is faced with financial difficulties. First, this study focuses on the probability of survival of the Kim Jong Il regime's survival and views regarding the possibility of its immediate collapse. The food crisis in North Korea was seen by many scholars in the U.S. and Korea as an obvious indication of its impending collapse. As a result. this perception affected the theoretical underpinning and implementation of U.S. and South Korean policy options toward North Korea especially since 1996. In the past. Washington and Seoul focused their policies on preventing North Korean military intervention and on encouraging North Korea to participate in international society -- rather than on policies of containment and isolation of North Korea. Currently. a more active policy of engagement is pursued by the troika of U.S. State Department.-- Stanley Roth. Charles Kartman. and Mark Minton. The team does its best to make sure that its policy envisions a stabilized North Korean regime and therefore, calls for the use of economic incentives in dealing with North Korea. The easiest means for its redefined goal of a "softer hard landing" is to mobilize international and domestic humanitarian relief efforts for North Korea. One of the advocates of the soft landing policy argues that the prospects of such a policy could well erode over a period of five to ten years if the United States and its allies remain wedded to policies that exacerbate the economic problems facing the Kim Jong Il regime. There is also another view which calls for the removal of U.S. economic sanctions in order to help the North advance its economic relations with the West and Japan as the key to solving its economic problems. especially its food shortages. According to his view the U.S. needs to remove the sanctions as promised since Pyongyang has already carried a nuclear freeze. Although sudden political change in North Korea cannot be ruled out. it is by no means inevitable. Marcus Noland and Chun Hyun Joon do not believe that Kim Jong Il regime will collapse soon. According to this view, North Korea will survive mainly because surrounding powers and South Korea may well prefer North Korea to survive rather than implode or explode into another major conflagration. In the case of North Korean regime's survival, providing aid simply to satisfy North Korea's food deficit does not seem to be a good policy. It is understandable that the axiom "do not destroy the defeated" can be the very efficient and clear principle for the American policy- makers to apply when they seek balance of power and status quo ante on the Korean peninsula. However, unconditional help from the United States based on soft landing may create deep strains in U.S.-R.O.K. relations. It will be unfortunate if Pyongyang thinks that U.S. has no option but to reward the North when Pyongyang makes threat. Over the past four years, Washington has mostly reacted to Pyongyang's demands and threats rather than shaping Pyongyang's choices. Perhaps this is the weakest point of the engagement strategy. As we have observed Clinton's policy behavior toward Beijing, Washington lacks the means to effectively penalize the Chinese government even if Beijing repeatedly violates the agreed principles on issues such as missile transfer and human rights. Likewise, the United States cannot easily force strong measures on the North -- regardless of the results of its engagement policy. It does not seem, however, that the United States is beginning to recognize the possibility of failure of its soft landing policy. However, this does not mean that the United States will likely scale back or cancel its current policy toward the North. Rather, the Clinton administration perceives that its current policy efforts should be stepped up by means of improving the U.S.-North Korean relationship. In this way, it can better prepare for an uncontrollable situation beforehand. Washington should remember that Pyongyang has yet to live up to the Geneva agreements in which it promised to resume the North-South talks. Therefore, the United States needs to provide assurances that improving the U.S.-North Korea relationship can contribute to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula while Pyongyang intentionally exclude Seoul from the process. At the very least, a U.S. soft landing policy will hopefully feature a more active engagement strategy, rather than focusing on prevention of a sudden North Korean regime collapse. In addition, it is hoped that United States will demand that North Korea undertake important economic and related reforms that will address the fundamental underlying structural weakness of its economy and its large and offensive-oriented military structure. There is a compelling need for the U.S. and South Korea to have a road map or a coordinated game plan. This means creating an incentive structure that calls for reciprocal steps to be taken by Pyongyang, Washington, Seoul, with a trade-off of a security for economics premised on a willingness by Pyongyang to reform its ailing economy. Aid for development or aid for defence conversion can surely be applied as the new strategic agenda between South Korea and the U.S in dealing with North Korea. Finally, this paper propose a new policy option for the new South Korean administration. Faced with a legacy of misunderstanding between the two Koreas, South Korea must maintain a long-range policy with patience. With this in mind, the Kim D ae-Jung administration should show, as Kim D ae-Jung has for so many years, firm and unyielding support for strong democratic values throughout South Korean society in order to strengthen U.S. confidence in Seoul. In conclusion, South Korea must identify where our ultimate interests lie and therefore, show the United States that it can rely with full confidence on a consistent South Korean position in dealing with North Korea. Therefore, in this new tripartite U.S.-R.O.K.-D.P.R.K. relationship, Seoul needs to inspire patience and tolerance in seeking not merely a symbolic victory but practical and real interests.