The game mechanism of stakeholders in comprehensive marine environmental governance
- Authors
- Jiang, Daokui; Chen, Zhuo; McNeil, Levi; Dai, Guilin
- Issue Date
- Feb-2020
- Publisher
- ELSEVIER SCI LTD
- Keywords
- Marine environmental governance; Stakeholders; Game theory; Rent-seeking behavior
- Citation
- MARINE POLICY, v.112, pp 2 - 8
- Pages
- 7
- Journal Title
- MARINE POLICY
- Volume
- 112
- Start Page
- 2
- End Page
- 8
- URI
- https://scholarworks.sookmyung.ac.kr/handle/2020.sw.sookmyung/1613
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.marpol.2019.103728
- ISSN
- 0308-597X
1872-9460
- Abstract
- In the process of marine resource development and marine environmental protection, the government supervises the production behavior of enterprises; enterprises accept government supervision; and non-profit organizations supervise the process. On this basis, a conceptual model of the relationship between government, enterprises, and non-profit organizations is established, and the internal mechanism governing their interactions is analyzed. Using game theory, a simulation model of government, enterprises, and non-profit organizations is constructed, and a Nash equilibrium solution and strategy selection analysis are carried out. The correlation between the game participants and strategy selection is simulated and analyzed with MATLAB 7 software. Lastly, relevant countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to engender effective supervision by government departments, continuous environmental development and effective environmental protection of enterprises, and effective supervision by non-profit organizations. Studying the regulatory strategies of the government, enterprises, and non-profit organizations can provide a foundation for marine resource development and marine environmental protection policy in accordance with the current situation.
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