도덕 판단에 대한 사실 과학적 접근의 윤리학적 함의

Abstract

Arguments concerning the nature of moral judgments have begun since Platon's Euthyphron, but the true sense of its real arguments started from the entrance of 20th century. Concerning this argument which is represented by G. E. Moore's intuitionism was substituted by emotivism. Recently as new theories such as moral realism, moral relativism, and various kinds of subjectivist and objectivist's theories appear, the arguments become very complicated and exquisite. But despite this happen, nobody can tell which theory is the final winner until now. The effort to solve the problem of the nature of moral judgment through philosophical discussion is at a standstill. In the meantime, the method of solving the problem through outside philosophy get shown on the surface, in concrete a group of scientists who want to solve the problem through science appeared, and some of modern moral psychologists are one of them. They are interested in ethics, especially meta ethics, and they are engaged in various part of science brain science, cognitive science, neuro-science, evolution etc. How much this trial was successful and will succeed is the theme of this paper.