한ㆍ중간 역사문화 및 영토문제의 현황과 전망

Abstract

China’s ‘Northeastern Project’ with the principle of ‘All the history which took place on the main land China belongs to China’s history’ was launched with a political intent. However, the logic employed by ‘the Northeastern Project’, advocating that China’s land extends all the way down to the Han-river in historical perspective, is not well received even within its own nation. It is deemed, therefore, that China’s ‘Northeastern Project’ is a failure in terms of academics, central politics, and international relations. On the other hand, we should keep a close eye on recent follow-up activities practiced by three major North-east regions in China. The efforts made in registering China’s Baekdu Mountain on the World Natural Heritage list are viewed in apprehension, mainly because the driving force is based on ‘Theory of Changbai Mountain Culture,’ identical with the idea of ‘the Northeastern Project’, and because it is also in connection with the development of Baekdu Mountain. It is because Baekdu Mountain is a direct connotation of our identity and symbolism. China’s effort of registering Baekdu Mountain to the UNESCO as a World Natural Heritage has been proven a failure this once due to resistance of South and North Korea, but they will give it another try sooner or later. In the future, we should work closely with North Korea to safeguard and develop Baekdu Mountain on North Korea’s land and respond proactively so that China does not make an unilateral attempt to register Baekdu Mountain. Another reason for ‘Northeastern Project’s existence is for Gando issue, enabling China to internally increase its awareness and get prepared on the national level. In other words, the unified future of Korea is linked with the Gando issue. In 1909, Japan and Qing Dynasty entered into Gando Convention whereby Gando and its residence became victims of Japanese imperialism and China’s great-power chauvinism. With the establishment of the New China in 1949 and Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in 1955, Gando residents were incorporated into Joseonjok. This historical background again generates discrepancies between two countries on perceptions and policies on Joseonjok today. To be exact, Korea sees Joseonjok as Chinese-Korean residents and has started to consider enforcing Korean law on them. China, on the other hand, claims that Joseonjok is one of its minor ethnicities thus is its people, and tries to avoid unrest and estrangement. It can be concluded that China promptly acted on ‘the Northeastern Project in order to address forthcoming issues around Joseonjok control and Gando, because South Korea has led the change on the Korean Peninsula since 1990s. Analysis reveals that Joseonjok cannot be separated throughout the history the relationship between Korea and China; its past, present, and the future. As the unified Korea in the future will form a border with Gando, Gando and Joseonjok issues become inseparable from the future relationship between Korea and China. As for the ‘Ieodo issue,’ another ‘quasi territory issue’ which has received attention in the new millenium, it will remain as a pending question among many diplomatic imperatives between Korea and China so long as China refuses the middle line for the marine boundary, which will inevitably call for diplomatic conflicts. Although a number of issues lay between Korea and China, clues to the solutions of these outstanding problems may be discovered if both parties take a broader view under the principles of communication for problem solving, living-together, and mutual respect.